Untangling Pahalgam’s Motives, Myths and a Path to Peace
What happened on 22 April 2025?
Just after 5-p.m. on 22 April, four gunmen opened fire on buses carrying holiday-makers near the Baisaran meadow outside Pahalgam. Twenty-six people—mostly Hindu tourists from Uttar Pradesh and Rajasthan and one Nepali national—were killed, and at least 17 were wounded. The assault, the deadliest against civilians in Kashmir since the 2008 Mumbai attacks, was quickly claimed by Kashmir Resistance (better known as The Resistance Front, TRF)—a militant outfit Indian intelligence links to Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT).
Within hours Delhi blamed “Pakistan-backed proxies,” revoked visas for Pakistani citizens, suspended the Indus Waters Treaty and sealed the Attari-Wagah land crossing. Islamabad retaliated in kind, closing its airspace to Indian carriers and expelling Indian nationals. The world’s two newest nuclear powers were again staring at a familiar precipice.
A convenient crisis for Delhi?
For the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), the attack reinforces its long-standing framing of Kashmir as a purely cross-border terrorism problem. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s first remarks stressed national unity but also promised that the “sponsors of terror will pay a heavy price. Visa bans and a dramatic suspension of a 64-year-old river-sharing pact are designed to signal resolve—but they also dominate prime-time television just as the campaign for the October–November Bihar assembly elections moves into high gear.
Bihar is India’s most Muslim-populous Hindi-belt state after Uttar Pradesh. BJP strategists privately admit that national-security messaging offsets anxieties over inflation, unemployment and last year’s contentious Waqf (Amendment) Act, which opposition parties say curtails Muslim religious trusts. A terror strike that appears to single out Hindus fits a polarising pattern seen before the 2014, 2019 and 2024 national polls: heightened rhetoric, muscular counter-measures, and the branding of critics as “anti-national.”
Rawalpindi’s own diversion
Pakistan’s defence minister called the massacre a “false-flag operation concocted to smear Pakistan and sway Indian voters. That claim is unproven, but the Pakistani military establishment has equally pressing reasons to shift the national conversation. Former Prime Minister Imran Khan sits in prison on a 14-year graft sentence and remains Pakistan’s most popular politician; street protests by his Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) supporters have tested the army’s writ for months. A crisis with India traditionally rallies public opinion behind Rawalpindi’s generals and reduces scrutiny of domestic repression, a familiar playbook since Kargil (1999) and the Pulwama-Balakot cycle (2019).
At the same time, Parliament in January quietly extended the army chief’s tenure from three to five years, cementing General Asim Munir’s power until 2027. A border flare-up justifies that extension and can open doors for additional military aid from Beijing or Gulf partners eager to contain instability.
Enter America, stage right
When the bullets flew in Pahalgam, U.S. Vice-President JD Vance was midway through a three-day visit to India, pitching deeper defence cooperation and semiconductor investment. Washington swiftly condemned the attack and offered intelligence support. The timing fuels speculation that spoilers—state or non-state—sought to embarrass Delhi, draw U.S. attention back to Kashmir, or complicate America’s fragile balancing act between India and Pakistan.
But the United States also benefits indirectly: renewed Indo-Pak tension accelerates India’s procurement of U.S. air-defence, ISR drones and high-endurance UAVs, deals already flagged in Vance’s briefing papers. A crisis that locks India tighter into the U.S. orbit against China is hardly unwelcome in some Beltway circles, though no serious analyst suggests direct American complicity.
Who, then, gains the most?
| Hypothesis | Evidence in favour | Caveats |
|---|---|---|
| TRF / LeT acting on Pakistan-based planning | TRF claim, pattern of past LeT proxy attacks, sophisticated coordination | Pakistan’s denials; high reputational cost during IMF bailout talks |
| Independent Kashmiri cell | Local recruitment has risen since 2022; targeting tourists undermines Delhi’s “normalcy” narrative | Logistics (automatic rifles, transport, intel) usually require external facilitation |
| Indian rogue actors / false flag | Rapid political capital for BJP; prior claims around Pathankot (2016) and Pulwama | No credible proof; domestic intel leak risk is high; TRF video may be genuine |
| ‘Third-party’ extremists (e.g., IS-K) seeking chaos | IS-K pamphlets surfaced in south Kashmir last year; sectarian modus operandi | No claim from IS-K; attack tactics resemble LeT more than IS-K |
A sober reading suggests the first hypothesis remains the most plausible, but none can be ruled out without transparent forensics.
The forgotten victims
Lost in geopolitical jousting are Kashmiris themselves. Hoteliers and shikara boatmen who saw record bookings this spring now face mass cancellations; “We are condemned for something we did not do,” a boatman in Srinagar told Al Jazeera. A 30 percent fall in advance tourist bookings within 48 hours threatens what little post-pandemic livelihood recovery the valley had enjoyed. Maternal clinics in Anantnag report trauma cases among local children who witnessed the shooting—innocent minds primed for radicalisation if the cycle continues.
De-escalation: five practical steps
- Joint UN-SCO forensic probe
Both nations should invite a mixed United Nations/Shanghai Cooperation Organisation team to audit ballistics and digital trails. Nothing else will still the talk of false flags. - Revive and widen the 2021 ceasefire
Daily director-level hotline calls along the 740-km Line of Control, monitored by UN observers, would cut misfires to a minimum. - Open a pilgrim corridor
A visa-free route between Pahalgam and Pakistan-administered Sharda Peeth, modelled on the Kartarpur initiative, would yoke religious tourism to peace and give both Hindus and Muslims a stake in stability. - Economic shock-absorber fund
Washington, Beijing and the Gulf sovereign funds should co-sponsor a $500 m tourism guarantee that releases grants when violence shutters the valley. Investors abhor uncertainty; so do families that depend on guesthouses. - Freeze tit-for-tat treaty warfare
India’s suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty and Pakistan’s air-space closure are mutually assured self-harm. Both should be time-bound (say, 60 days) and automatically lapse unless Parliament in each country votes to extend them.
A personal coda
The Pahalgam massacre has reopened Kashmir’s oldest wound just when a fragile calm offered a glimpse of normal life. Competing narratives now risk calcifying into hardened positions that serve political timelines in Patna and Rawalpindi more than they serve grieving families in Anantnag.
Whether the gunmen were guided from across the LoC, manipulated by shadowy agencies, or radicalised by local despair, their ultimate victory lies in the predictability of our reactions. Breaking that script requires transparency, empathy and, above all, sustained contact between ordinary Indians and Pakistanis whose lives are held hostage by a 78-year-old dispute.
Kashmir’s snow-fed rivers can irrigate two nations’ hopes or flood them with blood. The choice is ours—there is still time to write a different story.
